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Abstract
Scholarship examining U.S. homeland security policy proceeds from the
assumption that homeland security policy-making is a largely
domestic—that is, United States-centric—endeavor. This article
challenges that assumption. The mission of the Homeland Security
Enterprise is domestic security but achieving a satisfactory state of
preparation, prevention, response, recovery and resilience requires
efforts that extend beyond our boundaries. We argue that advances in
technology and globalization have accelerated the degree to which global
events directly and indirectly influence U.S. homeland security.
Contemporary threats do not recognize national boundaries; efforts to
counter them, accordingly, must transcend border lines as well. In this
article, we present evidence from the homeland security sub-fields of
border security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, public health, and
disaster management to show that U.S. homeland security policy is now
inherently transnational in nature and therefore best analyzed and
understood by taking a broader, global perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
On Wednesday, October 27, 2010, a young woman dropped off two 
packages in San’a, Yemen—one at a UPS store, the other at a FedEx 
location.1 Inside each of the two packages was a Hewlett-Packard 
desktop laser printer.2 Yet these were no ordinary shipments of office 
supplies. Within the toner cartridge of each printer was a small amount 
of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), a powerful explosive material 
used in construction and industrial work.3 The PETN had been inserted 
into the cartridges so that the printers, if X-rayed, would have appeared 
to contain ordinary laser printer ink powder.4 The cartridges were wired 
to small detonators powered by cell phone batteries.5 Both packages 
were addressed to synagogues in Chicago.6 UPS and FedEx employees 
in Yemen screened the packages manually, saw nothing obviously amiss 
within them, and cleared the packages to be shipped to the United 
States.7
The next day, intelligence officials in Saudi Arabia contacted their 
counterparts in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to advise them 
that they had received a tip about two package bombs constructed by 
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that were en route to the 
United States—the same two package bombs that had been shipped from 
San’a.8 Saudi officials were able to share with their American counterparts 
the precise tracking numbers for the packages.9 A furious hunt for the 
packages began. Intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic agencies 
in the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, United Arab 
Emirates, and Germany, together with officials from UPS and FedEx, 
exchanged information and coordinated their responses to the Saudi 
intelligence tip, ultimately leading to the discovery of the package bombs. 
Local authorities disarmed the explosives at airports in East Midlands, 
England, and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.10 Investigators later 
determined that the bombs likely would have detonated in mid-flight, 
causing the airplanes carrying them to crash into the Atlantic Ocean.11 
The 2010 AQAP printer cartridge bomb plot was by any measure a 
serious threat to the global supply chain, particularly the U.S. air cargo 
system. The plot also illustrates a remarkable shift in our understanding 
of U.S. homeland security policy. Virtually every element in the plot, from 
the moment the package bombs were dropped off in Sana’a until the 
explosives within them were disarmed in England and the United Arab 
Emirates, took place outside the United States. The cooperation and 
coordination of multiple governments’ security services and at least two 
air express carriers in the private sector led to the package bombs being 
located and disabled before the package bombs arrived in the United States.
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Most academic research on U.S. homeland security proceeds from the 
assumption that contemporary U.S. homeland security policy-making is 
largely a domestic endeavor. This article challenges that assumption. We 
argue that advances in technology and globalization have accelerated 
the degree to which transnational events directly and indirectly influence 
U.S. homeland security.12 In this article, “transnational” refers to the 
coalitions, contacts, and interactions that take place across state borders 
that are not controlled exclusively by the central foreign policy organs of 
governments.13 
Hardly any homeland threat today does not generate a cause or effect 
abroad. Our homeland security begins and ends not at the borders of the 
United States, but internationally, where people commence their travel 
and cargo goods are loaded for transport. It may sound paradoxical, but 
the fact remains that for the United States to have satisfactory homeland 
security, we need to direct our attention toward what is happening 
abroad. It is through collaboration with our foreign allies, in border 
security, law enforcement, and counterterrorism, that the United States 
will more effectively be protected. Many readers may be surprised to 
learn, for example, that the Department of Homeland Security now has the 
third largest civilian footprint outside of the United States of all federal 
agencies.14 Yet the scholarly literature on homeland security has not yet 
caught up with this evolution. 
The article proceeds in four steps. First, we introduce and describe the 
Westphalian nation-state system, which at first glance may appear to 
conflict with countering the global, dynamic, and persistent threats 
confronting the United States. We then show that scholarship on U.S. 
homeland security policy largely overlooks transnational security 
considerations. Next, we present evidence from the homeland security 
sub-fields of border security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, disaster 
management, and public health to demonstrate that transnational security 
concerns are integral to U.S. homeland security. The article concludes with 
a discussion of the policy and research implications of our findings.
NATION-STATES, TRANSNATIONAL FLOWS, 
AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
International relations scholars usually point to the Treaty of Westphalia 
in 1648 as the start of the modern nation-state system.15 The treaty ended 
the Thirty Years War in Europe and set in motion a system whereby 
sovereign European states began to co-exist.16 This system involved 
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principles such as mutual respect for the territorial integrity of states, 
agreements not to interfere in other nations’ internal affairs, and the 
legal equality of nation-states within the broader international system. 
As European influence spread globally, these pronounced concepts of 
sovereignty and nationality, and the prerogatives and implications which 
attached to them, were disseminated, as well.
Today, sovereignty asserts itself at national borders by determining who 
and what may enter, exit, or cross the space.17 This exercise of sovereignty 
along nation-states’ borders has long been a means for governments to 
assert and maintain internal political control.18 At the same time, nations 
levy customs and travel fees on the cross-border movement of people 
and goods to generate revenue. Borders today can therefore be thought 
of as both lines of sovereignty and points of flow. This new understanding 
of borders as lines and flows challenges the Westphalian conception of 
borders solely as “hard” boundaries around sovereign nation-states. 
To be clear, we are not suggesting that sovereign borders have become 
irrelevant or unimportant. However, because of accelerating technological 
innovation, time and space have been dramatically compressed such 
that global flows today are non-stop, and in many cases, instantaneous. 
Globalization is the cumulative effect of these trends: a 24/7/365 
movement continuously around the world of capital, labor, cargo, people, 
goods, services, ideas, images, data, and electrons. These flows today 
often operate independent of nation-states. They are the decisions 
of actors such as multinational corporations, terrorist movements, 
transnational criminal organizations, and other non-state actors. For this 
reason, they are sometimes referred to as “borderless” or “stateless” 
phenomena. Nevertheless, they continue to flow toward and over 
Westphalian borders, have their principal effects within nation-states, and 
the governments operating there regulate the actors. This presents us 
with an apparent contradiction: The sovereign power to regulate cross-
border flows remains exclusively national, while the flows themselves—
lawful and illicit—essentially are transnational.
The homeland security mission is to protect domestic security. However, 
achieving a satisfactory state of preparation, prevention, recovery, and 
resilience in the domestic context requires efforts that extend beyond 
our borders. Contemporary threats do not recognize national boundaries. 
Responses to these challenges, accordingly, must also transcend the 
borders that separate one country from another. Terrorism, cyberattacks, 
narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, pandemic diseases, money 
laundering, and natural disasters are transnational security challenges 
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with clear implications for U.S. homeland security policy. Understanding 
these threats, and developing innovative solutions to them, requires that 
security practitioners in the United States and abroad share information, 
collaborate, and adjust how they execute policies over time. For those 
working in the homeland security profession today, it comes as no 
surprise that the U.S. government must work regularly with allied nations 
and multilateral organizations to achieve its own homeland security 
objectives.19 The global homeland security enterprise—consisting of strong 
international engagement, cooperative partnerships among governments, 
and between the private and public sectors—is necessary for the security 
of all.
HOMELAND SECURITY SCHOLARSHIP: A NEXT 
GENERATION PERSPECTIVE
Existing scholarly conceptions of homeland security are almost entirely 
domestic in orientation and have been this way for well over a decade. It 
is important to emphasize that this literature is generally solid, focusing 
on significant domestic coordination and security challenges. However, 
it is incomplete, overlooking an important and expanding dimension of 
homeland security.
The years pre-dating the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 saw 
tremendous shifts in foreign policy emphases as well as the growth of 
terrorist attacks on U.S. targets from domestic and international actors. 
The Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union, which took 
place from approximately 1947 until the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, 
provides important historical context for understanding the growth in 
counterterrorism activities after 9/11. Some of the most prominent pre-9/11 
scholarship from the Cold War focused on the potential defenses against 
a Soviet nuclear attack on U.S. soil, for example, foreshadowing the rise of 
emergency management activities in the years after 9/11.20 
Terrorist attacks against U.S. government facilities in Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Kenya, and Tanzania between 1983 and 1998 underlined the rising 
threat posed by international terrorist groups.21 The bombings of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, as well as the 
World Trade Center in 1993, demonstrated that terrorists were capable of 
carrying out dramatic attacks inside the United States.22 Writing in Foreign 
Policy in 1997, John Deutch, a former director of the CIA during the 
Clinton administration, noted that “…if we are going to mount an effective 
campaign to combat [terrorism], we must clarify the roles and missions 
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of various government agencies. As it stands now, the responsibility for 
counterterrorist initiatives is divided.”23 Others scholars took up this theme 
of how to organize government agencies more effectively to combat 
terrorism in subsequent years.
Later research explored the ways in which misaligned U.S. agency and 
departmental missions left open significant gaps in the United States’ 
ability to deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks.24 These analyses 
focused on domestic policy affairs. Writing in spring 2001, Richard 
Falkenrath described a White House in the late 1990s which sought 
to coordinate a sprawling range of counterterrorism programs across 
the executive branch—a situation similar to conditions in the executive 
branch today.25 Falkenrath included a small reference to U.S. international 
counterterrorism assistance programs, but he placed this reference in a 
domestic policy context: “U.S. officials argue that [providing international 
counterterrorism assistance] has had considerable success in promoting 
greater counterterrorism efforts and discreet cooperation among other 
states, especially in curtailing state sponsorship of international terrorism. 
Critics argue that the U.S. response is excessive.”26 
Widely cited work published in the decade following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks similarly focused on domestic policy-making and politics. For 
example, research by Charles R. Wise and Rania Nader on the challenge 
of organizing the federal government to address homeland security 
threats does not mention other national governments or international 
organizations at all, though it does acknowledge the threat posed by 
international terrorism.27
Still other scholars have addressed transnational threats and their impact 
on domestic security policy-making in a general sense. These treatments 
of transnational threats are usually tangential and not U.S.-centric. 
For example, one 2009 study on the growing linkages among internal 
and external security problems used a primarily European perspective 
for its analyses.28 This research pointed out that most security studies 
scholarship “very rarely” ties together international and domestic security 
problems, underlining the need for the present study, which focuses on 
the transnational dimensions of U.S. homeland security.29 Other research 
has examined related issues, such as the connections among cross-
border migration and globalization-related phenomena like trade, or the 
collective action problems that can arise when multiple nations attempt to 
coordinate their respective counterterrorism policies.30 
Later post-9/11 research continued to emphasize domestic policy 
concerns by examining, for instance, domestic inter-organizational 
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coordination in response to disasters and prevention of global pandemics 
that may make their way to U.S. shores.31 A 2011 study that appeared 
in Policy Studies Journal sought to understand the cross-cutting policy 
forces that brought about the homeland security enterprise during 
the 2001-2004 time period.32  However, this work, too, overlooks the 
interactions between U.S.-based homeland security officials and overseas 
partners in its analyses. 
Only recently have scholars begun to grapple with how traditional 
notions of U.S. homeland security interact with transnational security 
considerations. One example appeared in October 2017, when Philip 
Osborn challenged the idea that cyberspace is borderless.33 Cyberspace 
includes physical infrastructure, which crosses sovereign borders, such as 
Internet cables. Therefore, Osborn argued, traditional customs authorities 
could be invoked to examine these cables and their digital contents for 
homeland security purposes.34
To be sure, federal agencies that later were folded into the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had, to varying degrees, 
established international ties with foreign counterpart agencies prior to 
9/11.35 Other non-DHS agencies that today form part of the homeland 
security enterprise, such as the CIA, also worked with international 
partners before the 9/11 attacks.36 Moreover, international groups, such as 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have acted for years as 
hubs for the exchange of important information among their members. 
Nevertheless, we maintain that there at least two key differences between 
these pre-9/11 international activities and the types of transnational 
homeland security initiatives that are apparent today. First, international 
cooperation pre-dating the 9/11 attacks was largely ad-hoc, in the sense 
that it was not geared toward achieving a cohesive group of policy goals 
that transcended multiple government agencies. Second, pre-9/11 global 
collaboration along these lines was not born out of the recognition that 
tackling U.S. homeland security threats abroad—in a systematic fashion—
can yield domestic security dividends. Rather, this pre-9/11 collaboration 
was oriented toward solving discrete sets of policy problems that 
were bounded by the specific missions of the government agencies 
participating in these partnerships.37 In both form and substance, then, 
transnational homeland security activities today represent a fundamental 
break from past practice.
It is now essential to advance understandings of the transnational 
dimensions of U.S. homeland security to increase knowledge of policy 
options and limitations in the homeland security sphere. By framing 
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homeland security in a transnational security context, policy-makers stand 
to make better-informed decisions about how to formulate strategies and 
allocate scarce time and resources to achieve their homeland security 
objectives. At the same time, understanding the transnational dimensions 
of homeland security fosters awareness of the limitations of internal 
security policies limited to the domestic context.38 
It is also imperative to bring current homeland security scholarship 
into line with contemporary practices in homeland security. Squaring 
homeland security as it is conducted with the broader literature on 
homeland security policy can benefit scholars by offering a more accurate 
assessment of policy conditions, which in turn can lead to analyses that 
are more precise. We next turn to the first of five homeland security sub-
fields that this article examines: border security.
BORDER SECURITY
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) secures and expedites 
the movement of people and goods across U.S. borders.39 In a 
globalized world, where technology has accelerated both transport 
and communication, the ports of entry at air, sea, and land borders 
have become the last line of defense, rather than the first, as they 
traditionally have been viewed. For example, the so-called Underwear 
Bomber, Nigerian citizen Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, boarded a plane 
in the Netherlands intending to ignite PETN explosive material and 
blow up a Northwest Airlines flight over Detroit in 2009. CBP identified 
Abdulmutallab as a person of interest after the flight departed from 
Amsterdam bound for Detroit. CBP officers planned to refer him for 
secondary inspection upon his arrival in the United States. However, 
this obviously would have been too late to prevent Abdulmutallab from 
blowing up the plane. Therefore, in retrospect, the “border” we needed 
to focus on was located not in Detroit, but at Schipol Airport in the 
Netherlands.40 The goal of border security, too, needed to change in 
this instance. Rather than intercepting Abdulmutallab upon his arrival in 
Detroit, U.S. homeland security interests would have been best served by 
preventing Abdulmutallab from boarding the Northwest Airlines flight in 
the first place.
Today CBP and other U.S. agencies with a stake in border security have 
pushed their operations “out”; that is, away from U.S. borders and toward 
the last point of departure abroad for people and goods bound for the 
United States.41 The U.S. government’s new global approach to border 
security is evident in operations conducted by CBP, Immigrations and 
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Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Coast Guard, and Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), in conjunction with partner agencies abroad.
The Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), including Passenger 
Name Records (PNR), are collected by airlines regarding each air traveler 
boarding a plane for travel in and toward the United States. CBP screens 
this data against information about known or suspected terrorists and 
other high-risk individuals. The Underwear Bomber plot highlighted 
the need to conduct the APIS and PNR security checks before planes 
departed for the United States rather than shortly before they arrived in 
the United States.42 Terrorists must be kept from boarding planes bound 
for the United States and not just prevented from being admitted into the 
country. This necessarily requires DHS component agencies to operate 
abroad by collaborating with foreign partners.43
CBP has made strides in developing a permanent overseas presence to 
stop or intercept dangerous people and things from making their way 
to the United States. For example, CBP officers based in Canada, the 
Caribbean, and the United Arab Emirates are an integral part of CBP’s 
preclearance program.44 This program deploys uniformed CBP officers 
abroad to screen people and goods bound for the United States at their 
original point of departure, rather than upon arrival in the United States.45 
In addition, CBP sends plainclothes officers to work in foreign airports 
through its Joint Security Program and Immigration Advisory Program.46 
These initiatives require close collaboration among CBP, airlines, and host 
country border and law enforcement agencies, with a view to stopping 
potentially dangerous individuals from flying to the United States.47 
The preclearance program has produced encouraging results. A 2017 
report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a federal 
watchdog, found that preclearance programs prevented over 10,000 
potentially dangerous passengers from boarding aircraft bound for the 
United States in fiscal year 2015 alone.48 This suggests that the program is 
achieving the desired effect of preventing potentially hostile actors from 
boarding U.S.-bound flights.
CBP’s Container Security Initiative (CSI) complements the preclearance 
program, in that it focuses on intercepting potentially hazardous cargo 
destined for the United States at departure points abroad. The CSI now 
has a presence at over 50 maritime ports around the world.49 Dating 
from the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the CSI 
uses intelligence and automated tools to identify potentially high-risk 
containers that may contain weapons or weapons precursors that could 
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be used by terrorists.50 Containers that are deemed high-risk are then 
screened using other technologies, such as X-ray machines or radiation 
detection devices.51 Some eighty percent of containers bound for the 
United States are now screened overseas through the CSI.52
There is limited publicly available data on the effectiveness of the CSI. One 
2015 GAO report indicated that CBP was not able to provide complete 
data on the disposition of certain containers that it had determined were 
high-risk.53 This suggests that it is at least possible that certain high-
risk containers were released from CBP custody without being properly 
screened or accounted for. Still, the CSI clearly represents an advance 
in cargo screening techniques for the United States, because it uses a 
systematic, intelligence-driven approach to target and screen higher risk 
cargo containers. In addition, it does so by enlisting time and space as 
early as possible and as far away geographically as possible before the 
goods arrive at U.S. ports of entry.54 
CBP also manages the Air Cargo Advance Screening Program (ACAS), 
which began in June 2018.55 The program requires foreign entities to 
submit, in advance, information about the goods they are shipping to 
CBP. Moreover, it is worth underscoring that this information sharing with 
CBP takes places prior to the point at which cargo is actually loaded on 
U.S.-bound aircraft. In this way, CBP is able to gain a better understanding 
of the goods that are being transported to the United States. In cases 
where there may be doubt or suspicion about certain cargo, CBP can 
work with shippers to prevent the cargo from being placed on aircraft. 
This sequence of steps can reduce the risks posed to aircraft, airline 
passengers, and the transportation sector as a whole by hazardous cargo. 
Moreover, it pushes the point of air cargo screening as far from physical 
U.S. borders as possible. ICE uses similar tactics abroad with respect to 
potential high-risk travelers to the United States.
Officials from ICE work with U.S. and foreign government agencies to stop 
potentially threatening individuals from making their way to the United 
States. For instance, DHS routinely places ICE officers in U.S. embassies 
as part of the Visa Security Program, where they collaborate with State 
Department (DOS) officials to screen U.S. visa applicants.56 These visa 
screenings target would-be terrorists and international criminals who, 
using fraudulently obtained visas, would otherwise seek to enter the 
United States and harm others.57 ICE officials also liaise with counterpart 
agencies in Mexico and Central America to obtain biometric data, such 
as fingerprints and photos, of Central American migrants and national 
“special interest aliens” from third countries who may pass through 
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Mexico en route to the United States.58 Moreover, ICE works with the 
governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, among other 
nations, to arrest members of violent transnational gangs and human 
trafficking organizations.59 Of course, the illegal movement of people 
and goods is not limited to land. Water-based trafficking of migrants and 
drugs presents challenges for homeland security, too.
Coast Guard personnel, like their ICE counterparts, work to reduce the 
risk of potentially threatening individuals and cargo entering the United 
States. One of the most visible examples of this work is the interdiction 
of illegal narcotics in the Caribbean. CBP operates several P-3 Orion 
surveillance aircraft and uses these planes to collect intelligence on 
suspicious vessels, which it then relays to Coast Guard ships.60 The Coast 
Guard ships, in turn, can set a course to intercept the suspicious vessels 
and determine whether they merit further investigation. Coast Guard 
personnel may also identify and stop potential drug trafficking on their 
own. For example, in 2013, a Coast Guard helicopter was used to shoot 
out the engine of a go-fast boat in the Caribbean, bound for the United 
States, carrying some $35 million dollars’ worth of cocaine.61 
The Coast Guard also plays a part in stopping irregular migrants who 
attempt to make their way to the United States. In 2015, for instance, 
the Coast Guard began to see a sharp increase in the number of Cuban 
migrants intercepted in the Caribbean who were bound for the United 
States.62 When the Coast Guard detains migrants at sea, the agency will 
usually transfer those detained migrants to ICE, which then arranges for 
the migrants to be returned to their countries of origin.63 
Interdictions of drugs and people like these are routine for the Coast 
Guard. In addition, they form part of a broader-based homeland security 
strategy. By conducting these operations in the Caribbean, the Coast 
Guard can stop the movement of potentially dangerous people and things 
toward the United States far from actual U.S. borders. The TSA carries out 
complementary operations in foreign airports with the aid of counterpart 
agencies.
The TSA must rely on foreign air transportation authorities to implement 
its security directives.64 For example, in 2017 U.S. intelligence agencies 
learned of a plot by ISIS to embed explosives in electronic devices, such 
as laptops and tablets.65 In response to this intelligence, the TSA issued 
new guidelines for U.S.-bound airline passengers that imposed restrictions 
on carrying certain devices in aircraft cabins. In the United Kingdom, 
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for example, these guidelines effectively banned any device larger than 
a smartphone from being placed in carry-on luggage.66 This example 
underscores the importance of close working relationships between the 
TSA and its counterparts abroad. Without these relationships, the TSA 
would have a much more difficult time ensuring the safety of U.S.-bound 
airline passengers. It is also worth noting that the TSA operates several 
programs related to the screening of cargo on passenger flights.67 These 
programs outline the specific technologies that transportation firms can 
use to screen air cargo. The programs also provide a means for firms to 
become certified cargo carriers.68
The operations discussed above by CBP, ICE, the Coast Guard, and 
TSA offer compelling evidence that the United States today takes an 
international approach to securing U.S. borders. These measures seek to 
push the point of security screening far from U.S. borders, thus reducing 
exclusive reliance on more rigorous screening at U.S. borders themselves. 
Border security is closely linked to U.S. counterterrorism policy, which we 
address in the next section.
COUNTERTERRORISM
The United States’ efforts to prevent terrorist attacks have led to a wide 
array of transnational counterterrorism initiatives undertaken on a “whole 
of government” basis. We explore here the military operations, economic 
sanctions, and intelligence cooperation that the United States leverages 
to reduce the possibility of terrorist attacks occurring inside the United 
States.
The U.S. military campaign to stop terrorists overseas before they 
directly threaten the United States has taken numerous forms. The 
most prominent recent example of this activity is the U.S. Department 
of Defense’s Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, 
which was established in 2014 to combat the rising threat posed by the 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).69 Together with the United States, 
79 partner nations have contributed military assets and resources to 
erode ISIS’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks outside the Middle East. 
Contributors to this task force include nations with large, professional 
militaries, such as France, the United Kingdom, and Australia, as well as 
nations with less robust military forces, such as Bulgaria and Fiji.70 At the 
time of the writing, the coalition’s efforts have been largely successful. 
ISIS’s geographical footprint in the Middle East has collapsed.71 The 
group’s ability to carry out attacks on U.S. interests in the Middle East has 
declined.72 Despite ISIS having weakened, the group still poses a threat to 
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the United States, in that it has proven adept at inspiring so-called “lone 
wolf” terrorists to strike targets inside the United States.73
International economic sanctions are tools designed to cut off terrorist 
financing sources. These sanctions usually prohibit the transfer of money 
or goods between sanctioned persons or entities, businesses, and financial 
institutions. The United States must rely on foreign financial institutions 
and governments to execute these sanctions. Since the U.S. dollar is 
universally respected as a kind of “global currency,” and given that U.S. 
financial institutions act as a hub for an enormous number of international 
financial transactions each day, the U.S. government can compel foreign 
financial institutions and governments to implement these sanctions. In 
addition, foreign financial institutions can incur penalties for violating 
these sanctions. That can shut them out from the global financial system. 
These institutions, therefore, have powerful incentives to comply with the 
U.S. government’s demands. 
Sanctions have been a preferred tool of both Republican and Democratic 
administrations. Before the United States fired a single missile into 
Afghanistan in 2001, President George W. Bush signed Executive 
Order 13224, which barred financial transactions with a list of 29 known 
terrorist organizations and suspected individual terrorists.74 The Obama 
administration used sanctions to pressure the government of Iran, a 
designated state-sponsor of terrorism, to stop developing its suspected 
clandestine nuclear weapons program.75 In addition, the Obama White 
House helped to spearhead the adoption of United Nations (U.N.) 
Security Council Resolution 2178, which explicitly called upon U.N. 
member states to disrupt financial transactions that may benefit terrorist 
organizations.76 President Donald Trump has signaled that he may impose 
financial sanctions on government officials in Pakistan if they do not 
stop promoting militant groups.77 At the same time, it is important to 
note that financial sanctions are blunt tools that can trigger unforeseen 
consequences, such as discouraging banks from setting up operations in 
contested areas. Still, given that each U.S. presidential administration since 
the 9/11 attacks has used sanctions to target terrorist financing, it stands 
to reason that these sanctions—while limited in their effectiveness—will 
continue to be used for the foreseeable future. In a similar vein, foreign 
governments have also played important parts in sharing intelligence that 
benefits U.S. homeland security interests.
There have been dramatic increases in international intelligence 
cooperation for counterterrorism since the 9/11 attacks. This cooperation 
appears to have had a direct, positive impact upon U.S. homeland 
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security. We acknowledge that intelligence is, by nature, secret. Success 
stories in the intelligence business are rarely made public. We must 
therefore rely on publicly available accounts of international intelligence 
sharing to assess its effects, both perceived and real.
Perhaps most notable among the United States’ intelligence-sharing 
agreements is the so-called “Five Eyes” group, consisting of Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.78 The 
origins of the Five Eyes group can be traced to accords between the 
United States and United Kingdom in the period during and immediately 
following World War II.79 Terrorism-related intelligence is today especially 
prized among Five Eyes members. U.S. government officials have publicly 
acknowledged the benefits of intelligence sharing for counterterrorism 
with Five Eyes members, too. For example, in 2004 U.S. Senate testimony, 
the U.S. State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism cited 
cooperation with the United Kingdom, along with France and Mexico, 
as being helpful for the United States in its response to specific aviation 
threats around Christmas 2003.80 More recently, in 2015 an Obama 
administration-backed U.N. Security Council resolution called for greater 
information sharing on the movement of so-called “foreign fighters” 
seeking to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria.81 In addition, in 2017, a meeting of 
security and justice officials from the Five Eyes group generated a joint 
communiqué noting the group’s mutual commitment to share timely, 
detailed information on terrorist and foreign fighter activity.82 Each 
of these examples underscores the strong link between international 
intelligence sharing practices and U.S. homeland security.
There are practical reasons that the United States shares intelligence with 
its allies. The United States is widely believed to be the most advanced 
of the Five Eyes members in terms of its ability to capture signals 
intelligence (SIGINT), such as emails, phone calls, and text messages.83 
The U.S. government shares SIGINT with other Five Eyes members.84 
At the same time, the United States has comparatively weak abilities 
to collect intelligence from human sources, or HUMINT.85 Therefore, the 
United States must sometimes rely on the stronger HUMINT capabilities 
of its allies to collect HUMINT.86 The differing comparative advantages of 
the United States and allied intelligence services can lead to exchanges. 
The United States may agree to send SIGINT collected from a target 
to another Five Eyes member. In return, the United States may receive 
HUMINT that the other Five Eyes member collected. This hypothetical 
HUMINT-for-SIGINT exchange points toward the importance of 
transnational intelligence cooperation for homeland security. Without this 
cooperation, U.S. policymakers can suffer from a less complete picture of 
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the threats that they face, potentially leading to less-informed decisions 
and less desirable outcomes. The need for intelligence on cyber threats 
has also grown in recent years. The next section explores the transnational 
dimensions of cybersecurity.
CYBERSECURITY
Cybersecurity concerns have risen in prominence within homeland 
security circles during the past ten years. Given that cyberspace is 
essentially borderless, the United States government’s efforts to address 
these concerns have led to new levels of international cooperation 
to combat cyber threats. In May 2011 the United States issued a new 
International Strategy for Cyberspace to provide a blueprint for building 
an international framework to make cyberspace secure and reliable. 
This requires a full range of partners—including other U.S. government 
agencies, the private sector, individual users of the internet, and 
international partners across the world. This strategy is not just a U.S. 
initiative, either. It is an invitation to other countries, organizations, and 
people to build innovative global networks. Especially notable in this 
regard are U.S. collaboration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the European Union (EU). At the same time, the DOS and 
DHS prioritize the use of bilateral partnerships in carrying out their 
respective cybersecurity missions: DOS to pursue cyber cooperation 
through diplomacy and DHS to promote private sector civilian 
cybersecurity and protect the federal .gov domain. 
NATO is a valuable forum for the United States to advance its 
cybersecurity objectives. When the United States participates in 
cybersecurity initiatives through NATO, this serves at least two purposes: 
strengthening the cybersecurity posture of fellow NATO members 
and advancing U.S. homeland security interests. The United States 
government contributes significantly to the rising importance of NATO 
in cybersecurity. For example, a former DOD official was recently named 
head of NATO’s Communications and Information Agency—the specific 
unit responsible for the alliance’s cybersecurity initiatives.87  The Tallinn 
Manual, an academic publication whose production NATO facilitated, 
represents the most comprehensive attempt yet to reconcile existing 
provisions of international law and the unique legal complexities 
surrounding conflict in cyberspace.88 U.S. scholars contributed 
significantly to the Tallinn Manual’s development, including James Bret 
Michael of the Naval Postgraduate School, Eric Talbott Jensen of Brigham 
Young University, and Chris Jenks of Southern Methodist University, all 
of whom are listed as contributors in the Manual itself. Beyond important 
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law and policy-related considerations, the United States has also applied 
its technical prowess to NATO’s cybersecurity initiatives. For instance, 
in April 2017, the United States participated in a NATO-sponsored cyber 
defense exercise that included participants from 25 nations.89 
The United States’ cooperation with the EU on cybersecurity issues 
dates to at least 2010. In that year, Obama administration officials and 
EU representatives launched the Working Group on Cybercrime and 
Cybersecurity to advance transatlantic cooperation for cybersecurity.90  
The Working Group collaborates on areas of mutual concern, such as 
cyber incident management and critical infrastructure protection.91 The 
EU-US cooperation on cybersecurity issues will likely continue due in part 
to shared democratic values.92 A 2014 EU-sponsored study published 
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies supports this idea, 
noting that there is great potential for transatlantic collaboration in 
constructing cyber “norms” for states.93 
Both the DOS and DHS make international coordination for cybersecurity 
an integral part of their respective operations. For example, in March 
2016, the State Department released its international cyberspace policy 
strategy.94 This strategy document lists numerous achievements that the 
State Department cites as examples of its diplomats promoting global 
norms in cyberspace to address international security concerns. These 
achievements include securing commitments from G20 leaders in 2015 
to refrain from stealing intellectual property online, as well the United 
Nations’ adoption of a U.S.-led framework for stability in cyberspace.95 
These examples demonstrate that the DOS, working through international 
institutions, has taken steps that in its view advance U.S. security interests. 
DHS has also leveraged its relationships with foreign governments and 
international organizations to advance U.S. cybersecurity interests. For 
example, since 2006 DHS has organized a biennial exercise called “Cyber 
Storm” to evaluate the abilities of U.S. government entities and U.S. allies 
to manage significant cyber events.96 The most recent of these exercises, 
Cyber Storm V, took place in 2016, and incorporated teams from most 
U.S. federal agencies, many U.S. state governments, over two dozen 
businesses, and 12 partner nations, including Australia, Hungary, New 
Zealand, and Switzerland.97 It is telling that DHS involved so many partner 
nations in Cyber Storm V. This broad involvement illustrates the extent 
to which DHS views international cooperation as essential to achieve 
its cybersecurity objectives. DHS has also emphasized internally the 
importance of expanding global cooperation for cybersecurity. The U.S. 
Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) and its counterparts 
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abroad meet routinely, further demonstrating the importance DHS 
attaches to its international partners.98
The need to strengthen international collaboration for cybersecurity 
has led the United States to ink several bilateral agreements with other 
nations, as well. For example, in 2015, President Obama and Chinese 
President Xi Jinping agreed in principle to refrain from engaging in 
government-sponsored online theft of intellectual property.99 In April 
2017, representatives from the DOS and the government of Argentina 
signed an agreement intended to develop policy communication channels 
for cybersecurity topics like critical infrastructure protection.100 In May 
2017, DHS finalized an agreement that would fund joint research among 
scientists in the United States and the Netherlands on the defense of 
industrial control systems (ICSs).101 Two months later, a DHS delegation 
flew to Tel Aviv, Israel to sign an accord that would develop joint working 
groups addressing topics such as international cyber policy, research and 
development, and the future cybersecurity workforce.102 These examples 
of cybersecurity-oriented international agreements highlight the degree 
to which DHS and other federal agencies now approach cybersecurity as 
an international matter of concern.
The steps taken above to bolster the United States’ cybersecurity 
capabilities take place amidst a rising tide of cyber threats. The Russian 
government, in particular, has ratcheted up efforts to delegitimize and 
destabilize the U.S. government using online tactics.103 For example, 
DHS concluded that the Russian government scanned electronic voting 
systems for potential vulnerabilities to exploit in over a dozen states 
during the 2016 Presidential Election.104  In addition, the U.S. Intelligence 
Community found that the Russian government executed a “multifaceted” 
influence campaign during the 2016 election, seeking to sway the 
views of American voters using social media platforms.105 After leaving 
government, James Clapper, a former U.S. Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI), flatly concluded that Russian cyber intrusions and manipulation 
of information “swung” the election in favor of Donald Trump.106 At the 
time of the writing, U.S. government investigations into the 2016 Russian 
influence campaign continue under Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller. 
Their outcomes are not certain. Nonetheless, the existence of this Russia 
influence campaign reinforces the urgency of the U.S. government’s 
efforts to strengthen U.S. computer networks against malicious attacks. In 
addition, the prospect of future online influence campaigns will no doubt 
figure prominently in discussions about the security of future U.S. elections.
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PUBLIC HEALTH
The U.S. government recognizes that the spread of global pandemics can 
pose serious risks to U.S. homeland security. Diseases can travel rapidly 
from one nation to another. Deadly strains of bacteria and viruses pose 
immediate and potentially widespread threats to persons inside the 
United States. Three ways the U.S. government advances public health 
initiatives are via global disease surveillance networks, international 
pandemic prevention campaigns, and deliveries of emergency assistance 
to nations suffering pandemics.
Within the federal government, numerous agencies share responsibilities 
for coordinating surveillance of international pandemics. The U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID), located within the DOS, operates 
the Emerging Pandemic Threats program.107 This program focuses 
on building the capacity of local, regional, and national governments 
to prevent, diagnose, and treat potential pandemics.108 This capacity 
building comes about by focusing on so-called “hot spot” areas, such 
as Central Africa, to amplify the potential impacts of USAID’s efforts.109 
However, USAID is not the only federal agency to monitor pandemics 
globally. The Department of Defense’s Chemical and Biological Defense 
Program conducts bio surveillance activities overseas and develops new 
detection and diagnosis technologies.110 In addition, the U.S. Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a component agency of 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), carries out 
sophisticated research on some of the deadliest known pathogens, such 
as the Ebola virus.111 
The United States has also embraced a transnational approach to prevent 
pandemics by promoting specific disease-prevention initiatives. For 
example, the George W. Bush administration launched the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, to reduce deaths from HIV/
AIDS in Africa.112 PEPFAR relies on networks of on-the-ground partners 
in Africa to implement the program and stay focused on results.113 Public 
health officials credit the program with saving the lives of millions in 
Africa.114 There is a powerful moral case to be made for saving persons 
infected with HIV/AIDS in Africa. However, PEPFAR also advances 
U.S. homeland security, in that it helps prevent the spread of an illness, 
which, even with effective preventions and treatments, continues to kill 
thousands of Americans each year.115
When pandemics occur abroad, the U.S. government can be swift to 
intervene with emergency assistance. This aid bolsters U.S. homeland 
Givens et al.: Going Global
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018
18Journal of Strategic Security
© 2018 
ISSN: 1944-0464 
eISSN: 1944-0472
Going Global
security, because it works to reduce the probability of deadly pandemics 
affecting large segments of the U.S. population. For example, during the 
2009 outbreak of the H1N1 influenza virus, the U.S. government spent 
some $16 million in international assistance funds via USAID, the CDC, and 
the Department of Defense to aid nations in Latin America struggling to 
contain the spread of the disease.116 A 2014 West African outbreak of the 
Ebola virus, which causes fatal hemorrhaging, led to a significantly larger, 
multi-pronged U.S. government response. The Department of Defense 
sent a U.S. Army general to Liberia to help coordinate DOD’s response to 
the outbreak. Some 3,000 U.S. Army also soldiers participated.117 USAID 
distributed “protection kits” to vulnerable households in Liberia.118 The 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), a component of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), accelerated testing of an experimental 
Ebola virus vaccine.119 The CDC deployed over 100 personnel to West 
Africa to provide on-the-ground expertise and logistical assistance to 
communities suffering from the Ebola pandemic.120 DHS began screening 
airline passengers arriving in the United States from the affected West 
African nations more closely upon their arrival in the United States.121 
Disasters can exacerbate the spread of diseases worldwide. Earthquakes, 
for example, can damage water purification and health care facilities. 
Communities may rapidly find themselves suffering from outbreaks 
of certain illnesses without access to these facilities. Effective disaster 
management, which we address in the next section, can prove essential in 
protecting communities from post-disaster pandemics.
DISASTER MANAGEMENT
Natural and man-made disasters routinely pose threats to the United 
States. The ways in which those disasters are addressed influence U.S. 
international approaches to disaster management worldwide. These 
include processes of response, recovery, and resilience carried on 
domestically and internationally. The U.S. response to the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake, the federal government’s development of a strategy to 
absorb international assistance during U.S. disasters, as well as global 
accords to address climate change, exemplify this transnational 
orientation in disaster management.
The U.S. government’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake illustrates 
several of the ways in which U.S. approaches to disaster management 
have become transnational. The earthquake devastated Haiti, killing over 
300,000 people and rendering more than one million Haitians homeless.122 
The earthquake knocked out electricity to the entire capital city of 
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Port-au-Prince. The temblor destroyed 14 of 16 government ministry 
buildings, the presidential palace, and the parliament building, effectively 
decapitating the government.123 
The U.S. response to the earthquake began in dramatic fashion. Within 
hours after the earthquake, a Haitian government representative drove a 
motorbike to the residence of U.S. Ambassador Kenneth H. Merten and 
verbally delivered an official request for U.S. government assistance.124 
Within less than 24 hours, the first U.S. government team arrived in Haiti 
to begin assisting in the disaster recovery process.125 President Obama 
designated USAID as the lead U.S. government agency for assisting in the 
recovery following the earthquake, though he also ordered the executive 
branch to employ a “whole of government” approach.126 
DHS contributed significantly to these “whole of government” efforts. 
The U.S. Coast Guard ship Forward arrived in Port-au-Prince on January 
13, 2010. The Forward’s crew began immediately to aid earthquake 
victims. Coast Guard personnel later helped to re-open the country’s 
maritime ports.127 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
established an incident support base in Florida. It later deployed an 
incident response team and 10 search and rescue groups to Haiti.128 CBP 
re-allocated personnel to Miami to help screen and process individuals 
entering the United States from Haiti. Following the collapse of a jail in 
Haiti, ICE agents helped their Haitian counterparts to identify prisoners 
who had escaped.129 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
cleared over 1,000 Haitian children to come to the United States.130 These 
examples of DHS assistance to Haiti provide clear evidence of the new 
transnational approach to disaster management. At significant expense, 
the U.S. government re-allocated DHS personnel and equipment to aid its 
Caribbean neighbor. 
Besides serving humanitarian needs, this re-allocation of people and gear 
also served U.S. homeland security interests. For example, by investing 
early in Haiti’s recovery, the U.S. government likely increased the chances 
of Haitian earthquake survivors remaining in Haiti, rather than fleeing to 
the United States. The United States has seen Haitian immigration crises 
in the past. Beginning in the early 1970s, waves of so-called Haitian “boat 
people” made their way to the United States.131 The timing of these waves 
has often coincided with periods of political and economic turbulence 
in Haiti. In 1992, for example, a government coup in Port-au-Prince led 
thousands of Haitians to escape by sea to the United States. U.S. Coast 
Guard ships intercepted many of these Haitians.132 In 2004, during a period 
of both political unrest and grinding poverty, a second wave of Haitians 
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made their way to the United States.133 Detaining, interviewing, and 
processing these Haitians’ immigration applications comes at significant 
cost to the U.S. government. By providing direct aid to Haiti following the 
2010 earthquake, the U.S. government was essentially calculating that the 
cost of providing direct aid would prove less than the potential unknown 
future cost of managing a post-quake immigration wave from Haiti. In 
this way, providing direct disaster relief aid to Haiti served U.S. homeland 
security interests.
The U.S. transnational approach to disaster management has also worked 
in the other direction—that is, when U.S. allies assist the United States 
following disasters that take place inside the United States. Although little 
reported on at the time, large numbers of U.S. allies offered the United 
States government assistance following Hurricane Katrina in 2005.134 
The governments of Bangladesh, Thailand, Germany, and Kuwait sent 
money, equipment, and personnel to perform tasks like pump out flooded 
areas, feed disaster survivors, and rebuild damaged levees.135 The U.S. 
government recognized the need to develop an integrated strategy to 
absorb and manage these sorts of donations in the future. As a result, 
in 2010 DHS published its International Assistance Strategy (IAS), which 
sought to develop an organized system for managing aid offers. The DOS 
was designated as the lead agency for coordinating foreign offers of 
assistance.136 FEMA retains the sole authority under federal law to accept 
or reject offers of assistance.137 Moreover, FEMA can make decisions 
regarding the disposition of potentially unused donations.138 It is important 
to underscore that the IAS is not activated following every federal disaster 
declaration. The FEMA Administrator makes that decision depending 
upon the conditions he or she faces during the disaster in question.139 
Nevertheless, the existence of the IAS demonstrates that DHS recognizes 
the importance of a transnational approach to disaster management and 
has taken steps to integrate this transnational approach formally into its 
daily operations.
Domestic and international initiatives to address the effects of climate 
change further illustrate the degree to which disaster management has 
become transnational in scope. During the Obama administration, federal 
agencies were charged with developing plans, procedures, and strategies 
that would take account of the effects of climate change in preparation 
for the future.140 To fulfill this charge, in 2013 DHS published a Climate 
Action Plan that linked the effects of climate change to DHS’s five mission 
areas.141 DHS maintains that the effects of climate change may exacerbate 
social tensions and political unrest in areas abroad where state capacity 
to address terrorism is limited.142 As a result, climate change, at some 
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level, may be one factor that can “enable” terrorist activity.143 At least two 
studies support this finding, which suggests that natural disasters can lead 
to a rise in domestic and transnational terrorist activity.144 Moreover, DHS 
states that climate change can lead to powerful storms that may knock 
out vital telecommunications infrastructure. This, in turn, can pose risks 
to human lives, especially when persons are unable to contact relevant 
authorities during a life-threatening emergency.145 
U.S. approaches to disaster management at home and abroad have 
become markedly transnational in recent years. In the U.S. government 
response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the development of an 
International Assistance Strategy, and efforts to address climate change, 
it is apparent that global events and considerations influence U.S. 
government decision-making in the homeland security arena.
The five homeland security sub-fields that we have assessed thus far in 
this article each illustrate the growing transnational orientation of U.S. 
homeland security policy. In the next section, we begin to outline some 
of the most significant implications of this transnational understanding 
of homeland security. We also offer suggestions for homeland security 
policymakers to integrate this new transnational approach to homeland 
security more effectively.
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This article has shown that far from being a purely domestic matter, 
homeland security policy today has become transnational in nature, in that 
forces and events outside the United States affect U.S. homeland security 
policy, both directly and indirectly. There at least three major implications 
arising from this shift in our understanding of U.S. homeland security 
policy: first, this evolution has implications for institutions that formulate 
homeland security policies and suggests a functional realignment among 
the organizations charged to implement those policies. Second, this shift 
in perspective and paradigm helps illuminate a potential evolution in the 
federal approach to homeland security established in the wake of 9/11—an 
evolution that represents a more global understanding of the homeland 
security field. Third, the traditional frameworks scholars and policy 
analysts use to examine and assess homeland security may no longer 
provide useful research lenses or produce entirely accurate results. We 
examine each of these implications below.
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Implications for Homeland Security Institutions 
As we have shown, the federal government places homeland security 
officials abroad to protect the American homeland from external 
threats.146  This change breaks down old dichotomies and definitions by 
which policymakers and analysts in the past drew distinctions with a 
difference. The activities of DHS agents and officers overseas blur the 
traditional boundaries between national security and law enforcement, 
on one hand, and law enforcement and border security, on the other. The 
subject matter of their missions more and more frequently coincides. For 
this reason, border security and law enforcement capabilities in the future 
may come to be viewed as another form of national power, alongside 
intelligence, military action, diplomatic activity, depth of financial 
capacity, and energy independence. We admittedly are at the threshold 
of exploring these shifts, but the requirement to examine them rigorously 
and systematically seems clear.147 
The federal government institutions dedicated to addressing homeland 
security issues also may no longer mesh well with the increasingly 
transnational nature of homeland security threats. Historically speaking, 
the National Security Council at the White House is the mechanism 
through which inter-agency disputes are resolved and “whole of 
government” responses engineered. However, homeland security 
challenges have spawned new executive-level positions and offices. For 
example, President George W. Bush created the Assistant to the President 
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism position in 2001.148 That 
position continues to exist. Bush also established via executive order the 
White House Homeland Security Council in 2003.149 Bush’s successor, 
President Barack Obama, saw homeland security and national security 
issues as natural complements. He merged the staffs of the National 
Security Council and Homeland Security Council.150 At the same time, 
President Obama preserved the independent structures and membership 
of the councils themselves.151 At the time of this writing in 2018, President 
Trump retains the independent structures of the councils. 
Given the evolution of homeland security threats, the NSC’s role in 
homeland security has expanded in recent years. Thus, it is not difficult 
to envision a future in which the Homeland Security Council and National 
Security Council merge entirely. The 2001 creation of the Homeland 
Security Council, like DHS itself, reflected the broader public mandate for 
the federal government to react quickly in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.152 The Homeland Security Council’s structure was based upon the 
structure of the National Security Council. Similar to the National Security 
Council, the Homeland Security Council initially complemented a White 
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House Office of Homeland Security and a homeland security advisor.153 
There was, and remains, significant overlap among the HSC and NSC’s 
memberships.154 In light of these factors, merging the HSC and NSC into a 
single organization may align them better with the transnational nature of 
contemporary homeland security threats.155
Implications for Homeland Security Functions
DHS component personnel stationed abroad promote the “soft” homeland 
security power of border security and law enforcement with their foreign 
counterparts. The Department’s Office of Policy and International Affairs 
leads efforts to forge agreements with DHS’ overseas partners and 
works with the international affairs offices in the DHS component offices 
to do so.156 The bulk of these agreements pertain to law enforcement 
cooperation and training, capacity building programs, and information 
sharing.
As DHS’s international role expanded and its fragmented deployment 
was coordinated through regional strategies generated internally at 
DHS, significant tension resulted with the DOS. The DOS views itself, 
consistent with its role in the past, as the U.S. Government’s exclusive 
voice in conducting U.S. foreign policy. It has been allocated exclusive 
legal authority, for example, to dispense foreign aid and assistance funds. 
Yet considering the changed circumstances attendant to homeland 
security in a globalized context, it may be helpful for DHS to receive direct 
authority and appropriations from Congress to design, fund, and conduct 
law enforcement programs abroad. There may also be opportunities for 
funding comparable programs in border, aviation, and maritime security 
with other host governments. This could potentially facilitate greater 
return on DHS’s relationships with foreign partners.
Implications for Homeland Security Scholarship
The analytical tools scholars use to assess U.S. homeland security policy 
may also need to adjust to the new transnational homeland security 
paradigm. Public policy research has a reputation for being “theory 
poor.”157 Public policy scholars frequently borrow or adapt theories and 
tools from other disciplines for policy studies of homeland security. Yet 
these theories and tools may no longer be adequate. Policy scholars 
may look to new sources for theoretical and analytical models. In 
particular, international relations and economics offer an array of robust 
theories with good explanatory power. These disciplines take account of 
governmental, organizational, and individual behavior in their theories. 
Tools and theories from these disciplines may help scholars better 
understand the transnational forces that influence homeland security 
policy today.
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